Twists and Turns in the South Caucasus

The peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia proceeds slowly but in the right direction.

After the latest instalment in Moscow, on 26 July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, said “the path is not easy,” and summarised the current progress:

“There are many complex and important issues to be resolved. The most sensitive of them was and remains the issue of guaranteeing the rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in the context of ensuring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in full accordance with the 1991 Declaration signed by the leaders of the former Soviet republics in Alma-Ata. Its effectiveness has been confirmed today by both the Azerbaijani and Armenian leadership. The work on the peace treaty is being built in accordance with this.

“The Armenian side understands the need to convince the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to meet as soon as possible with Azerbaijani representatives to agree on the rights arising from the relevant legislation and from international obligations, including numerous conventions on ensuring the rights of national minorities… The Azerbaijani side is ready to provide the same guarantees on a reciprocal basis with respect to persons living on its territory. Armenians are ready to do the same with respect to the application of all conventions to citizens residing in the Republic of Armenia.”

It is undoubtedly true that it is the pressure which Baku has exerted on Yerevan over the past year that has been the major driver of any momentum that exists in the peace process. That pressure has involved turning the screw on Armenia through various means, including enforcing the principle of sovereignty on the Karabakh Armenians through picket lines and establishing a border checkpoint on 23 April regulating the movement of people and goods along the Lachin Road and the occupying of some strategic territory in dispute on the borders of the two states.

It should be noted that contrary to what is asserted by Armenians, Article 6 of the November 2020 Declaration does not require Azerbaijan to facilitate the unimpeded free movement of goods along the Lachin Road. It actually tasks Azerbaijan with ensuring “the safety of citizens, vehicles and goods” in both directions along the route. Ensuring “the safety of citizens, vehicles and goods” along the Lachin route involves responsibility for the character of the people and goods in transit in the same way that an airline has an obligation for this and exercises it by restricting the carriage of certain items and the right to identify and confiscate anything considered illicit or dangerous. And that is on top of the sovereign right to operate customs controls around a state’s territory.

Azerbaijan has offered the Aghdam route, which it specifically built, and which does not connect directly with Armenia, as a new alternative for transport, whilst the Lachin Road can be confined to emergency transport, which continues unhindered. This solution removes the possibility of smuggling of arms and other illicit goods into the territory, but the Armenians are not happy because it does not provide direct, unhindered access to Karabakh from Armenia. Charles Michel, much to the chagrin of the Armenians, welcomed the offer at the recent Brussels talks. The Karabakh Armenians promptly built concrete bollards to block the new route made available in order to prevent its use in supplying food. It was more important to maintain the “blockade” show and not concede to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.

In the past few days a long convoy of identical large white trucks have rolled out of Armenia, under much fanfare, designed for the special view of EU observers and international media. It is a propaganda stunt launched to convey the message to the World what cruel and brutal people these Azerbaijanis are, when they stop it in front of the World’s press. If, of course, the Azerbaijanis were to allow its entry they would cede a great victory to the power of Armenians standing together.

The measures introduced by the Azerbaijan Government to maintain its sovereignty have been fancifully described as a “blockade” and “attempted genocide” by the Karabakh Armenians. Of course, this is the usual Armenian gift of exaggeration. Although the measures have caused a great deal of inconvenience to the 100,000 or so Armenians in Karabakh they hardly amount to what they are described as.

As the present writer has previously pointed out, a real blockade is a thing of much greater destruction. In the 8 months after the Germans signed the armistice in November 1918 they were subjected to a naval blockade by the Royal Navy to produce an acquiescence to defeat and the terms of the Versailles Treaty. A.C. Bell in his official history of the blockade for the British Admiralty estimated that the blockade resulted in the deaths of 250,000 German civilians during this period, after the war had officially concluded.

The so-called “blockade” of “Artsakh” has been of the same duration but it hasn’t produced enough casualties even for the powers of Armenian exaggeration to work with.

Whilst the strategy of holding Pashinyan’s feet to the fire has caused much discomfort for the Prime Minister of Armenia, it must be admitted that he has handled the situation well. Pashinyan is showing signs, in fact, of becoming a real statesman. He has made clear statements during the negotiations with both Russia and West that “Karabakh is Azerbaijan”, by acknowledging the territory and sovereignty of Baku over Karabakh. He has used this fact in international law, as well as the practically universal recognition of it by the international community for 3 decades, and the failure of previous administrations to ever formally recognise the “Artsakh” pseudo-state, to beat away his opponents.

Pashinyan seems to have learnt from his mistake in the period before the 2020 war, in attempting to outflank his irredentist opponents, by becoming an aggressive nationalist – a mistake that brought on the war itself. Now, paradoxically, defeat in the war has enabled him to face down the malevolent influence of the Karabakh Clan on Yerevan politics.

Pashinyan has, seemingly, returned to his original reform agenda of clearing out the corrupt Russian/Armenian oligarchs and establishing economic functionality in Armenia. The economy is booming and the future is looking much brighter for the Armenian people than it ever did in the years of the Karabakh Clan governments. Relations with Turkiye are improving and if the opening of economic links is now achieved Armenia will benefit enormously, reducing its economic dependency on Russia.

However, the main stumbling block to peace seems to be a determination among Armenians to “internationalise” the issue of the Karabakh Armenians. This again is a ploy to override the fact of Azerbaijan sovereignty over the territory of Karabakh. Baku will be determined to confine dialogue with the Armenian citizens of Azerbaijan to the internal sphere as much as possible, signifying that this is a peace process between government and citizens, or their representatives. There is no special “status” determined by external forces. The future position of the Karabakh Armenians and any structures that emerge within the state to facilitate their absorption as functional citizens will be through a process of internal dialogue.

Richard Giragosian, the Armenian US Democrat, made some interesting comments recently to the California based Armenian diaspora channel, CivilNet. He was asked if Washington and the West was likely to come to Armenia’s rescue as it did to Ukraine’s?

Giragosian said that the South Caucuses, unlike Ukraine, is not a vital interest for the United States. It’s engagement there is not substantial and it is basically attempting to push back Russian influence in the region rather than seeking to establish a base there itself. He said that those Armenians who believed that the US was interested in pursuing a policy of “promoting democracy” in the region and would take on the Aliyev Government as a consequence of “extending democracy”, were going to be disappointed. “Democracy protection” rather than “democracy promotion” was it’s aim in the South Caucasus. Democracy had a foothold in Armenia and the primary interest of Washington was in protecting the Pashinyan Government against the largely pro-Russian opposition. 

This means, said Giragosian, that Armenia, rather than Azerbaijan, is of much greater interest to Washington. He then comforted the host with the argument that Azerbaijan has less leverage in the West than it had 20 years ago, when energy was very important. The Pentagon is no longer interested in Azerbaijan, he suggested. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan downgraded the geographical and strategic significance of the country for the West. Whilst the EU has an interest in energy supplies from Azerbaijan, the United States, a self-sufficient energy producer, has not. And because of net zero policies right across the West the leverage Azerbaijan had in the past will diminish strongly over the next decade.

On the other side, it seems that Russia has a greater interest in Azerbaijan. The North-South corridor linking Russia to Iran and Eurasia is an important interest for Moscow which has been forced to turn eastward by the turn of events from 2022. It is also vitally important for the Kremlin that a friendly and non-threatening neighbour is preserved between it and Iran. This gives Baku some useful leverage with Moscow because of Eurasian development amplified by the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia.

This is probably why Armenia works hard to foster good relations with Iran and hopes to stir up trouble between Teheran and Baku.

At the moment, the Armenian and Azerbaijanis have cleverly replicated the negotiation process during the parallel Russian and Western series of talks. Morsels of advancement have been provided at each meeting, whether they be in Moscow, Washington or Brussels, to drip feed the hosts. Russia and the West have been skilfully played off whilst keeping the wider geopolitical conflict at bay.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the limitations of both Russian and Western power. The Russians have been drawn into Ukraine and are now in a quagmire from which they will find it difficult to retreat, whilst the West has bitten off more than it can chew, with Russia being a more formidable state than it was reckoned to be. Extrication from the disaster will be very problematic without destroying Ukraine or causing a catastrophe for the wider world.

One thing some Armenians have learnt from Ukraine is that peace negotiations may be used to string along an opponent while forces are built up and war is prepared for – as Kiev and the West admitted doing during the Minsk talks. Massispost said as much on 9 July in an opinion piece headlined, ‘Termination of Negotiations Deemed Currently Inexpedient’:

“These negotiations are also crucial for buying time. It is no secret that Armenia is currently not ready for a large-scale war. However, efforts to modernize the Armenian army, equip it with modern weapons, and adapt a new military and strategic doctrine are underway. In recent decades, the military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan was disrupted due to the indifference of former governments. Restoring the balance requires time and money. The current government is determined to make the necessary financial investments for the country’s security. The issue of time will be resolved by continuing the negotiations.”

Some things change, others remain the same, in the twists and turns in the South Caucasus.

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