Two significant events have occurred in the South Caucasus in recent weeks. Firstly, the West has thrown its weight behind Armenia’s breakaway from Russian hegemony. Secondly, the Russian peacekeepers, who took up positions in 2020, have begun withdrawing from the Azerbaijani territory of Karabakh.

Let us first acknowledge that Nikol Pashinyan has good reasons for his pivot to the West, which is now paying dividends in the high profile public support he is receiving. The picture of the Armenian Prime Minister with the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, EU Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, Josep Burrell, is, no doubt, meant as an important geopolitical signal.

The Baku based news agency Caliber revealed the startling agreements concluded between the US, EU and Armenia, at Brussels.

The United States will provide Yerevan with expert support for the Strategic Defence Review and the development of Armenia’s new military doctrine. Bilateral military cooperation will be aligned with Armenia’s cooperation with NATO in realising the partnership objectives of the Planning and Exploration Process (PARP) and the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC).

The United States will provide the assistance necessary to significantly develop Armenia’s military and defence capabilities and strengthen border control and security, with particular attention to the border with Iran. Washington will send analytical teams to Armenia to conduct an on-site assessment of air force and air defence capabilities, taking into account Armenia’s integration into the CSTO Joint Air Defence System. The US will provide funds to Armenia under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme to facilitate its access to advanced military equipment and the latest technology. The US Armed Forces will participate in joint military exercises and training with the Armenian Armed Forces to ensure interoperability and will strengthen Armenia’s defence capabilities through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme. Washington will also work to accelerate the widespread use of GPS (Global Positioning System) technology throughout Armenia, which has proved so important in Ukraine.

The European Union will accept an aid package under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armenian Armed Forces. This package aims to strengthen Armenia’s national security, stability and sustainability in the defence sector. It will also improve operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with EU and NATO standards, and ensure the interoperability of the Armenian Armed Forces. The assistance package also aims to strengthen the capacity of the Armenian Armed Forces to participate in operations and missions under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The EU and Armenia will also hold regular consultations on defence and security issues and will cooperate to ensure the long-term presence of the EU Mission to Armenia (EUMA) and expand its functions through a significant increase in staff. The EU will assist Armenia in building defence infrastructure on its border with Azerbaijan, including engineering reinforcements. The US and the European Union will establish a joint military and defence task force to coordinate the implementation of Armenia’s defence and security resilience programme. Bringing the Armenian army into full compliance with NATO standards, ousting the Russian military and pro-Russian elements in the Armenia Armed Forces from Armenia

As Caliber concludes:

“All these actions point to preparations for Armenia’s possible accession to NATO in the medium term. At the same time, the West is opening its arms market for Armenia and is itself financing Armenia’s purchase of these weapons. We will provide this information at the appropriate time.”

What is the Armenian leader himself getting out of this? Firstly, Western backing is essential to preserving his power in Yerevan in the diplomatic and moral support it provides for his position, which was precarious after defeat in 2020 and 2023. Secondly, it is what he needs to edge out Russian influence in Armenia, which Pashinyan has concluded, rightfully or wrongly, to be of little use to Armenia’s security or national interest. The Russian ambit was proving disadvantageous in relation to Azerbaijan, which had assumed preponderance within that landscape. 

Thirdly, Pashinyan knows that the courting of the West gives him an advantage against Baku which will bolster Armenia’s defences and enhance its economy and military capability. He has a willing and capable military supplier in France. Not only that, he will hope that the West, standing shoulder to shoulder with Armenia, enhances pro-Western anti-Government forces in Azerbaijan, something which is not only in Yerevan’s interest but Washington’s. 

What we have is a confluence of interests between the Pashinyan Government and the West, developing in the wake of the Ukraine war, which bothparties view as advantageous.

Armenia is not looking for conflict with Russia. It is looking to ease itself away from Russian dependency toward the European sphere, toward the benefits of EU association and membership. That is probably what it should have done in the 1990s, if it had not ruined its independence by chasing territory in Karabakh and beyond, which chained it to Moscow. However, that process will not be easy given the economic ties between the two countries.

It is noteworthy that Armenian angst toward Russia seems to be entirely to do with Moscow’s reluctance to assist it and the Armenian separatists in Karabakh against the imposition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the full territory of Karabakh. The Armenians seemed to believe that Moscow’s small military mission would fight alongside the separatist forces in resisting an Azerbaijani anti-terrorist operation that made short work of the separatist military forces in less than a day. That really was a forlorn hope.

It was the Armenian nationalist diaspora that encouraged the voluntary mass exodus of Armenian population of Karabakh. It continues to represent this migration as an “ethnic cleansing” and even “genocide” to international bodies. Of course, Armenia has not got much purchase out of this, particularly when Israel is at present engaging in the closest thing one could imagine to genocide and ethnic cleansing, courtesy of Western weapons and finance.

The Armenians in Karabakh were encouraged to fear the incoming Azerbaijanis and not to trust the Russians as peacekeepers. They had cleared 800,000 Azerbaijanis out of the region in the early 1990s and obviously did not want them back as neighbours. Yerevan went along with the hysteria to damn the Russians and escape their embrace. Pashinyan obviously concluded that any anger he might face from those who fled could be handled with the West at his back. The West secured the exit of the Russians and were happy to back Pashinyan in what he was doing.

If the Armenian population had remained the Russians still had a mission under the Trilateral Agreement of 2020, at least until 2025. 

In effect this must grate on the Kremlin, since it indicates that the only use Armenia had for Russia was in its conflict with Azerbaijan, and the holding of Karabakh apart from Azerbaijan. The defeat of 2023 has revealed that Armenia was all along quite ready to run off on the promises of wealthy Western suitors as soon as its historic benefactor hit challenging times.

It should be noted that Azerbaijan achieved all its recent victories within the Russian sphere of influence, availing first of good neighbourly relations with Moscow and then the Russian difficulty in Ukraine, to complete the liberation of its national territory. This is why Pashinyan now seeks to alter the landscape to fight on a different Western inhabited battlefield, which he believes is more to Armenia’s advantage. 

The Armenian Prime Minister would be happy to keep Azerbaijan, which attempts a balanced foreign policy, as closely tied to Moscow as possible to enhance the distinction between it and Armenia in the West. He believes in the dominant narrative he hears from the West, pitting “democracy against the authoritarians” and, of course, President Biden has already made it clear which camp Armenia and Azerbaijan are in.

The Ukraine war reduced Russia’s priorities in the South Caucasus and Azerbaijan saw the opportunity of pushing forward to complete the liberation. It was understood that Russia could not afford to play balancing games with regard to Karabakh when it relied heavily on both Turkiye and Azerbaijan to mitigate the effect of Western sanctions. It could be said that Eurasia is assuming greater importance since the events in Ukraine and the Middle Corridor, at which Azerbaijan lies in a strategic position, will be an important alternative to other routes with the increasing likelihood of Middle East conflict.

In short, Moscow needed all the neutrality it could muster when the West was arrayed against it and the Turkish neutrality was much more valuable to it than anything Armenia might offer. At that point Azerbaijan had the opportunity of launching the final phase of the liberation war, anticipating Russian acquiescence. 

Russia was in Karabakh as a peacekeeper and is now leaving, having fulfilled that role. Russian peacekeepers will evacuate fully by September 2024.

The Russian peacekeepers remit would have run out in November 2025. It was in Baku’s power to request an extension of the mission, but that was unlikely given the Armenians’ reluctance to settle, with the Russians in situ. It is improbable that Moscow would have resisted the termination of their mission, although it is possible that Russia might have obtained some security concessions from Baku to ease its departure. Whether it has, or walked away empty handed, will remain undisclosed by Baku or Moscow. There is, however, an alliance betweenMoscow and Baku, signed on the eve of the Special Military Operation into Ukraine.

The US and EU surely know the effect of its high-profile meeting with the Armenian Prime Minister, which excluded Baku, and its very public show of solidarity with one party to the conflict will have with neighbours – Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkiye and the Russian Federation. So it must be regarded as a calculated “shot across the bows” of these countries. Of course, the main target is Russia, but the shot is designed to make the point that association with that state may result in collateral damage to those seen as collaborating with it. The sanctions Bill against the Azerbaijani liberators of KRabakh being prepared by Congress is the first manifestation of this.

The danger is that it might embolden Armenia into provoking a new conflict along the border with Azerbaijan using new Western weapons, a reformed military and moral support from Washington and the EU. Yerevan might hope to draw Western support into such a conflict, on the Kyiv model,when it recovers its confidence.

Because the World is in such flux at the moment, it would be difficult to predict how all this plays out. However, a Russian return to the South Caucasus cannot be entirely ruled out, given how the war is going against Ukraine.