George Friedman has always been an outsider within the US foreign policy establishment. Some would say he is not part of the establishment at all, since the Council on Foreign Relations has barely tolerated mention of his name over the past couple of decades. One presumes this is because Friedman has resisted the constraints that those within the ambit of the CFR allow to be imposed upon them in the interests of patronage and their careers.

The Council on Foreign Relations was formed under the Woodrow Wilson Presidency in 1921. In discussions at the Paris Peace Conference in May 1919, at the Hotel Majestic, a group of British Round Table and American diplomats and scholars came together and decided to create an Anglo-American organisation called the Institute of International Affairs. The British were members of Lord Milner’s famous and influential kindergarten and many of the Americans had been involved in dreaming up Wilson’s Fourteen Points which encouraged the German capitulation in late 1918. Now it was time to combine to share out the world.

It was later decided that it was impolitic to have a single Anglo-American Institute of International Affairs, so the British part became the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) while the Americans formed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Because of the isolationist atmosphere in the US the CFR initially held discreet meetings which invited dozens of prominent bankers, financiers, manufacturers, lawyers and scholars. From the outset the CFR was in favour of an internationalising of US values and intervention in the wider world. However, at that point the American people were not ready for such a mission.

However, after the British Empire had blundered into a second world war in a generation and had to be, again, bailed out by the US, America was forced to take Europe in hand and enter the world stage to perform the function Britain had proved incapable of, after its victory in 1918. It did this to success in 1991 but then, without an enemy of consequence, the US went into blundering mode itself.

George Friedman has described the nature of US foreign policy sometimes in a way that may be considered damaging to the narrative of those who form the foreign policy establishment in New York and Washington. He has a habit, in other words, of saying things which, although true, should not be said. There is an aligned and acceptable narrative to be preserved, and it imposes limits and constraints. Michael Mandelbaum, a former State Department official noted that “to be members in good standing of the foreign policy establishment” officials are “required to take care not to violate limits.”

One of President Obama’s staffers memorably described the US foreign policy establishment as “the blob”. Most of the owners and editors of large US media groups are board members of the CFR and it exercises predominant influence on the foreign press narrative as a result, as well as acting as a gatekeeper against alternative views. Friedman formed a kind of alternative establishment (or counter-establishment?) to “the blob” with Stratfor, where he teamed up with investment bankers to present his own view of things, based on geography and demographics, a much sounder basis for thinking than liberal ideology. Fund managers are often rebels to the establishment because they can make profits betting against the herd in the money markets, through their superior knowledge of developments. Friedman and his funders have survived because social media gives them a platform that the traditional media struggles to contain and which chimes with the thinking public, sick of failed propaganda produced by a careerist elite.

The Obama Presidency were irritated by “the blob,” seeing it as being responsible for too many “forever wars” which then had to be cleared up by the new President. But the Obama Presidency failed to shake off “the blob,” for all their good intentions in the world, and more destructive wars were encouraged by Washington in Syria, Libya etc. One reason for this is that Obama’s Secretary of State was Hillary Clinton, one of the most prominent members of “the blob”.

Obama seemed to realise that the most important job of the US President, if he is concerned with peace in the world, is to constrain the Washington foreign policy establishment. The US Constitution has many checks and balances, but the Founding Fathers did not imagine the power the country would have in future world affairs. It is in this area that there are fewest safeguards, and while America is safe from tyranny, despite worrying about Donald Trump, the wider world is not so safe, from America.

The first Donald Trump Presidency was a lean time for “the blob.” The rogue president had a businessman’s attitude to foreign affairs that was primarily aimed at securing good deals for America in its relations with the world. He did not care for unprofitable, distracting wars or in advancing liberal ideology. He had functional relations with people “the blob” depended upon being seen as the epitome of evil and “the blob” were side-lined to some extent during his term. They ruminated in the background, dreaming of the good old days when America was feared and respected in the world through the wielding of a big stick. When Biden was triumphant in 2019, they were ecstatic at the thought that “America is Back!” which they proclaimed in numerous articles in their periodical Foreign Affairs.

The Biden Presidency was the return of “the blob” to the big time. It started badly when the US beat a humiliating retreat from Afghanistan, after Trump wound up the war and Biden botched the withdrawal. Biden proclaimed US red lines and ignored other Powers when they said they had red lines too. The result was the Ukraine war of February 2022.

More than a decade before, George Friedman had predicted the war in Ukraine on the basis of the geography and nature of Russia, the history of Europe and the behaviour of the US from the end of the Cold War. He did this in a book which became the New York Times bestseller, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21^st Century.

Friedman will not be thanked by the US foreign policy establishment for saying some of the things he said, and it is not surprising that he has been blackballed as a result. But with current developments in the US and Ukraine he may get another innings.

Russia 2020: Rematch (George Friedman, 2009)

Russia is the eastern portion of Europe and has clashed with the rest of Europe on multiple occasions. The Napoleonic Wars, the two world wars, and the Cold War all dealt, at least in part, with the status of Russia and its relationship to the rest of Europe. None of these wars ultimately settled this question, because in the end a united and independent Russia survived or triumphed. The problem is that the very existence of a united Russia poses a significant potential challenge to Europe.

Russia is a vast region with a huge population. It is much poorer than the rest of Europe but is has two assets – land and natural resources. As such it is a constant temptation for European powers, which see an opportunity to increase their size and wealth to the east. Historically, Europeans who have invaded Russia have come to a disastrous end. If they are not beaten by the Russians, they are so exhausted from fighting them that someone else defeats them. Russia occasionally pushes its power westward, threatening Europe with the Russian masses. At other times passive and ignored, Russia is often taken advantage of. But in due course, others pay for underestimating it.

The Cold War only appeared to have settled the Russian question. Had the Russian Federation collapsed in the 1990s and the region fragmented into multiple smaller states Russian power would have disappeared, with the challenge of Russian power poses to Europe. Had the Americans, Europeans and Chinese moved in for the kill, the Russian question would have been finally settled. But the Europeans were two weak and divided at the end of the 20th Century, the Chinese too isolated and preoccupied with internal issues, and after September 11th, 2001, the Americans were too distracted by the Islamist war to act decisively. What actions were taken by the United States were insufficient and unfocused. In fact, these actions only served to alert the Russians to the great potential danger from the United States they faced and ensured they would respond to it.

Given the simple fact that Russia did not disintegrate, the Russian geopolitical question will re-emerge. Given the fact that Russia is now re-energising itself, that question will come sooner rather than later. The conflict will not be a repeat of the Cold War, any more than World War I was a repeat of the Napoleonic Wars. But it will be a restatement of the fundamental Russian question: If Russia is a united nation state, where will its frontiers lie and what will be the relationship between Russia and its neighbours? That question will represent the next major phase in world history – in 2020, and in the years leading up to it.

If we are going to understand Russia’s behaviour and intentions, we have to begin with Russia’s fundamental weakness – its borders, particularly in the northwest. Even when Ukraine is controlled by Russia, as it has been for centuries, and Belarus and Moldavia are part of the Russian Empire as well, there are still no natural borders in the north… On the northern European plane, no matter where Russia’s borders are drawn, it is open to attack. There are no significant natural barriers anywhere on this plain. Pushing its Western border all the way into Germany, as it did in 1945, still leaves Russia’s frontiers without a physical anchor. The only physical advantage Russia can have is depth. The farther west to Europe its borders extend, the farther conquerors have to travel to reach Moscow. Therefore, Russia is always pressing westward on the northern European plane and Europe is always pressing eastward.

In the south, there it has a natural secure boundary. The Black Sea leads to the Caucasus, separating Russia from Turkey and Iran… Therefore, the Russian Empire, in any of its incarnations, is fairly secure except in northern Europe, where it faces its worse dangers – geography and powerful European nations.

Russia had its guts carved out after the collapse of communism. St. Petersburg was about a thousand miles away from NATO troops in 1989. Now it is less than one hundred miles away. In 1989, Moscow was twelve hundred miles from the limits of Russian power. Now it is about 200 miles. In the south, with Ukrainian independence, the Russian hold on the Black Sea is tenuous, and it has been forced to the northern extreme of the Caucasus… If there were an army interested in invading, the Russian Federation is virtually indefensible.

Russia’s strategic problem is that it is a vast country with relatively poor transportation. If Russia was simultaneously attacked along its entire periphery, in spite of the size of its forces, it would be unable to easily protect itself. It would have difficulty mobilizing forces and deploying them to multiple fronts, so it would have to maintain an extremely large standing army that could be redeployed. This pressure imposes a huge economic burden on Russia, undermines the economy, and causes it to buckle from within. This is what happened to the Soviet State. Of course, this is not the first time Russia has been in peril.

Protecting its frontiers is not Russia’s only problem today. The Russians are extremely well aware that they are facing a massive demographic crisis. Russia’s current population is about 145 million people, and projections for 2050 are between 90 million and 125 million. Time is working against it. Russia’s problem will soon be its ability to field an army sufficient for its strategic needs… Given Russia’s demographic trajectory, in 20 years it may be too late to act, and its leaders know this…

For one hundred years the Russian sought to modernize their country through industrialization, trying to catch up to the rest of Europe. They never managed to pull it off. Around 2000 Russia shifted its strategy. Instead of focusing on industrial development, as they had in the past century, the Russians reinvented themselves as exporters of natural resources, particularly energy, and also minerals, agricultural products, lumber, and precious metals. By de-emphasizing industrial development, and emphasizing raw materials, the Russians took a very different path… This move not only saved the Russian economy but also strengthened it to the point where Russia could afford to drive its own selective industrialization. Most important, since natural resource production is less manpower intensive than industrial production, it gave Russia an economic base that could be sustained with a declining population.

It also gave Russia leverage in the international system. Europe is hungry for energy. Russia, constructing pipelines to feed natural gas to Europe, takes care of Europe’s energy needs and its own economic problems, and puts Europe in a position of dependency on Russia. In an energy hungry world, Russia’s energy exports are like heroin. It addicts countries once they start using it. Russia has already used its natural gas resources to force neighbouring countries to bend to its will. It reaches into the heart of Europe, where the Germans and the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe all depend on Russian natural gas. Add to this it’s other resources, and Russia can apply significant pressure on Europe…

Russia will therefore use some of its wealth to create a military force appropriate to protect its interests, buffer zones to protect it from the rest of the world – buffer zones for the buffer zones. Russia’s grand strategy involves the creation of deep buffers along the northern European plain, while it divides and manipulates its neighbours, creating a new regional balance of power in Europe. What Russia cannot tolerate are tight borders without buffer zones… To its neighbours, united against it, Russia’s future actions will appear to be aggressive, but they will actually be defensive…

The Russians must dominate Belarus and Ukraine for their basic national security. The Baltics are secondary but still important… Ukraine and Belarus are everything to the Russians. If they were to fall into an enemy’s hands – for example, join NATO – Russia would be in mortal danger. Moscow is only a bit over two hundred miles from the Russian border with Belarus, Ukraine less than two hundred miles from Volgograd, formerly Stalingrad. Russia defended against Napoleon and Hitler with depth. But without Belarus and Ukraine, there is no depth, no land to trade for an enemy’s blood. It is, of course, absurd to imagine NATO posing a threat to Russia. But the Russians think in terms of 20 year cycles, and they know how quickly the absurd becomes possible.

They also know that the United States and NATO have systematically expanded their reach by extending membership of NATO into Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. As soon as the United States began trying to recruit Ukraine into NATO, the Russians changed their view both of American intentions and of Ukraine. From the Russian point of view, NATO expanding into Ukraine threatens Russian interests in the same way as if the Warsaw Pact had moved into Mexico. When a pro-Western uprising in 2004 – the Orange Revolution – seemed to sweep Ukraine into NATO, the Russians accused the United States of trying to surround and destroy Russia. What the Americans were thinking is open to debate. That Ukraine in NATO would be potentially devastating to Russian national security is not…

The inclusion of the Baltic countries, along with Poland, in NATO has moved NATO’s frontier extraordinarily close to the Russian heartland. For a country that was invaded three times in the last two hundred years, the comfortable assumption that NATO and its members are no threat is not something it can risk.

From the Russian point of view, the major invasion route into their country is not only wide open but also in the hands of countries with a pronounced hostility to Russia. The Baltic countries have never forgiven the Russians for their occupation. The Poles are equally bitter and deeply distrustful of Russian intentions. Now they are part of NATO, these countries form the frontline. Behind them is Germany, a country as distrusted by the Russians as Russia is by the Poles and Balts. The Russians are certainly paranoid – but that doesn’t mean they don’t have enemies or that they are crazy…

The Americans could bring substantial power to bear if they chose… The United States, always excessively aggressive from the European point of view, will be stirring up unnecessary trouble in Eastern Europe as a threat to the Russians. If the Germans allow NATO to do this, they will be drawn into a conflict they don’t want… However, Poland, caught in its historic nightmare between Russia and Germany, will become even more dependent on the United States. The United States, seeing a low-cost opportunity to tie down the Russians and split Europe down the middle, weakening the European Union in the process, will increase support for Eastern Europe… a new bloc of nations, primarily the old Soviet satellites coupled with the Baltic nations, will emerge. Far more energetic than the Western Europeans, with far more to lose, and backed by the United States, this bloc will develop a surprising dynamism… The Russians will be made into a regional threat (for Europe) and that is the context in which the United States will respond. There will be tension all along the Russian frontier.

Given the confrontation, European dependence on hydrocarbons, much of it derived from Russia, will become a strategic issue. The American strategy will be to deemphasize the focus on hydrocarbon energy sources. This will kick into high gear the American interest in developing alternative sources of energy. Russia as before will focus on its existing Industries rather than on the development of new ones that will mean increased oil and natural gas production rather than new energy sources. As a result, Russia is not going to be in the forefront of the technological developments that will dominate the later portions of the century.

Instead, Russia will need to develop its military capabilities. Thus, as it has over the past two centuries, Russia will devote the bulk of its research and development money to apply new technologies towards military ends and expanding existing Industries, causing it to fall behind the United States and the rest of the world in non-military but valuable technology. It will be particularly hurt, paradoxically, by its hydrocarbon riches – because it will not be motivated to develop new technologies and will be burdened by military spending…

The United States, in particular, tends to first underestimate and then overestimate enemies. By the middle of the 2010s the United States will again be obsessed with Russia… Russian military power will be severely strained confronting the fraction of American military power that the United States decides to wield in responding to Russia’s moves… The causes that ignited this confrontation – and the Cold War before it – will impose the same outcome as the Cold War, this time with less effort for the United States… Internal pressure will divert Russian attention and eventually, even without war, it will break. Russia broke in 1917, and again in 1991. And the country’s military will collapse once more, shortly after 2020.

Published in Irish Foreign Affairs, Winter 2024.