John Mearsheimer has been asked the question: Should Britain have fought World War I?
In answering the question, he noted Niall Ferguson’s view that it shouldn’t have.
Ferguson put forward this view around a decade ago in his ‘Pity of War’ book and other writings. In the light of knowledge of the loss of the Empire as a consequence of overreach in 1914, Ferguson said Britain would have been better staying out of European conflict and living with a victorious Germany. He even suggested that a Germany victory would have only hastened something like the European Union – rather than being the triumph of barbarism over civilisation, as the war propaganda had it.
In response to this Mearsheimer stated: “Britain had no choice but to get involved in World War 1 and World War 2. It was the correct decision in both cases… Entering the wars was the least bad alternative in 1914 and 1939.”
Mearsheimer argues that Britain had to play the Balance of Power in Europe to maintain its world dominance. He suggests it took the British, French, Russians and the United States to finish off Imperial Germany – it was so powerful. Britain was needed to defeat Germany in both World Wars and prevent it from dominating the continent.
Mearsheimer noted that Britain, being an island state, had no necessity to involve itself in European wars and had gone to lengths to avoid continental warfare during most of the 19th Century. It avoided European wars to accumulate its worldwide Empire. In three cases – 1792, 1914 and 1940 – it could not do this, according to Mearsheimer. It had to militarily intervene to tip the Balance of Power against a potential European hegemon and do something it was always determined to resist.
Mearsheimer said that whenever Britain is faced with an emerging hegemon on the continent it is forced to intervene. It was necessary for Britain to ally with Russia in both world wars to prevent Germany getting control of its resources and have them at its disposal.
The same logic applies to the United States, according to Mearsheimer. It, therefore, was forced to bail out Britain on both occasions in each of the world wars. The military material and economic support it supplied to Britain was not enough for Britain to win its wars and direct US military intervention was necessary from April 1917 and December 1941.
Mearsheimer stated that the USA had no choice but to enter both world wars after Britain had taken them on and failed to conclude them with its allies.
Using the same logic Mearsheimer argues that both Britain and the US should not be helping Ukraine because Russia today is hardly a threat to Europe. It has neither the will nor the means to dominate the continent as Germany had in 1914 or in 1939 and become a hegemon.
Mearsheimer tends to minimise Britain’s role in both world wars. With regard to the first its intervention created the World War. Before Britain decided on intervention there was only a European war. Before that it was a Balkan war.
The British world-wide empire marshalled to fight a global conflict in which the British Empire planned to expand itself in the Middle East and elsewhere, made for a world war. The peculiar party-political conflict in Britain at the time, sharpened by the conflict over Irish Home Rule, exerted a powerful pull, aimed at overriding a civil war through a European intervention that cohered the state.
It was made into a catastrophic conflict when it was invested with a powerful moral dimension by the Liberal government and its supporters in Parliament – Liberal and Irish.
The British intervention had been planned for around a decade. That is detailed in the writings of Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, and the files of the Royal Navy and Committee of Imperial Defence.
What happened next was what was not planned for or anticipated by Britain.
An interesting book was published a few years ago in America. It was by the British naval historian, Andrew Lambert. It is called ‘The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy.’
Julian Corbett was a writer who published short, populist biographies of English military heroes until his two-volume work on Francis Drake received excellent reviews and caught the eye of many key naval historians and naval thinkers of the day, including the future First Sea Lord, Admiral Jackie Fisher.
Fisher and Corbett worked together over the next 20 years shaping the Royal Navy that entered the Great War. Admiral Fisher’s reforms were explained through Corbett’s pamphlets, books, newspapers and periodicals. Corbett’s writing was also the inspiration for the establishment of the Naval War Course, where his ideas became influential in the strategic education of many of the Royal Navy command. But despite all their efforts, Fisher and Lambert were unable to correct the continentalist ‘drift’ of British strategy that they both judged very dangerous for the British Empire.
Corbett built the evidence to support the view that continentalist ‘decisive battle’ thinking was antithetical to Britain’s history and its circumstance as a global maritime empire, rather than a continental power based on mass conscript armies. In the process, Corbett found himself in conflict with the War Office and the anti-Fisher elements of the Admiralty through the leading periodicals and newspapers. Encouraged by Fisher, Corbett published historical studies about the strategic culture and history of the British Empire. He advanced the case for the successful historic limited maritime strategy of Britain’s way of war against those who were suggesting commitment to continental warfare was now essential to see off Germany.
Corbett’s efforts to influence the important strategic direction of the war were ultimately scotched by the influence of the First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill. Lambert highlights the difference between Churchill’s later record as British Prime Minister during the Second World War with his continentalist leanings and war mongering as the First Lord of the Admiralty in the opening years of the Great War.
Churchill largely misunderstood British sea power, despite occupying the position at the head of the Admiralty. After he vetoed Admiral Fisher’s plan for the combined use of the Royal Navy and the British Expeditionary Force to threaten the closure of the entrances to the Baltic, including the Kiel Canal, forcing the German High Seas Fleet to seek an engagement, he spent much of the rest of his time searching for solutions to the wasteful war of attrition Britain had been drawn into on the continent. One of his schemes was the disastrous adventure at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. Churchill was more responsible than anyone else for the Ottomans becoming an enemy as he seized two Turkish battleships being built in British shipyards at the outset of the conflict, 3 months before the British declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire. He also launched a blockade on Istanbul while Turkey was neutral.
During the Second World War, as Prime Minister, Churchill waged an entirely different war – returning to the traditional British way of war. This meant withdrawing from the continent as soon as battle went wrong in May 1940, abandoning allies and searching for new ones to do the fighting against Germany. Britain reverted to a naval war and the use of strategic bombing and amphibious “pinpricks” to provoke the Germans. Britain made sure its casualties were kept low by allowing the Russians and Americans to carry the main burden of the war.
It is also noticeable that the war for civilisation against the barbarian of 1914 was not resurrected in 1939. Herr Hitler was not demonised in the same way as the evil Kaiser. Arthur Bryant’s sympathetic book about Germany, ‘Unfinished Victory’, was published in early 1940 – when Britain had been at war for 6 months – by Macmillan and received well by the political class and public. Only after May 1940 was Bryant given the signal that this book would be damaging to his reputation and he attempted to buy up available copies.
Britain was fighting a Balance of Power war without the moral dimension of 1914 and would take on Bolshevik Russia as a gallant ally if needs must.
Of course, it was too late for the British Empire by 1940 because the fatal mistakes had been made at the outset of the Great War of 1914 and they were compounded by British weakness of will as global hegemon in its victory in 1919.
John Mearsheimer, whilst an excellent commentator on current affairs, relies on a Realist Theory of Great Power Politics which does not seem to have the capacity to explain the “illogicality” of decision making that makes up history.
It is this that has made the current war on the territory of the Ukraine inexplicable from the perspective of Realist Theory – which indicates it is a dangerous diversion from more pressing Western business against the rise of China.
Britain today seems to be a reckless provoker of conflict – relieved of its responsibility as global hegemon by the United States. The question is whether the US can save itself from going the same way as Britain as its grip too on the world weakens.
On Mearsheimer’s logic the United States will fight a world war against China.
Published in Irish Political Review December 2026

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